Case law in the field of arbitration has, in particular, refined the review of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction (I) and provided numerous clarifications regarding the public policy review (II). Finally, this overview will discuss the TotalEnergies case, which illustrates what could constitute a potential misuse of criminal and arbitration proceedings (III). In summary, these decisions demonstrate the French courts’ commitment to striking a fair balance between the theoretical reaffirmation of their power to review awards and the preservation of the arbitrators’ work.

I. The Paris Court of Appeal provided clarifications that refine the review of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction

In a decision dated 9 December 2025, the Paris Court of Appeal once again ruled on what should now be called a true saga: the so-called Sultan of Sulu case. The French aspect of the case concerns an action for annulment filed against a final arbitral award dated 28 February 2022. That decision ordered the Malaysian government to pay damages totaling nearly 15 billion U.S. dollars to the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu.[1] How did it come to this?

The dispute stems from an agreement dated 22 January 1878, between the Sultan of Sulu and the founders of the British North Borneo Company, concerning territories on the northern coast of Borneo, which are now part of the Malaysian federal state of Sabah. While the parties disagree on the scope of the agreement – which the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu characterize as a lease agreement and Malaysia as an agreement to cede territory and sovereignty[2] – it appears that the royalty paid by Malaysia was initially set at 5,000 ringgits, increased to 5,300 ringgits by a confirmation deed in 1903. The arbitration clause included in this 1878 agreement provided that any dispute would be submitted to arbitration by the British Consul General in Borneo. Since Malaysia had paid this royalty until 2013 before ceasing its payments, the heirs initiated arbitration proceedings against the State in 2017.[3]

Since, at the time the arbitration was initiated, there was no longer a British Consul General in Borneo (the position had been abolished), the claimants had requested that the British Foreign Office appoint an arbitrator. Faced with the British authorities’ refusal to intervene, the claimants brought the matter before the Superior Court (Tribunal Superior de Justicia) in Madrid, acting as a supporting judge, which appointed a sole arbitrator. The arbitrator declared himself competent by an interim award rendered in Madrid on 25 May 2020. However, this proceeding was set aside in June 2021 by the Spanish courts, which held that the rules governing the service of process on foreign states had not been followed.[4] Refusing to comply with this decision – which resulted in a conviction for contempt[5] – the arbitrator transferred the seat of the arbitration to Paris and rendered his final award on 28 February 2022. In response, Malaysia filed multiple appeals with French courts. First, it sought to have the French courts reject the recognition and enforcement in France of the partial award on jurisdiction. Then, taking advantage of the change in the seat of arbitration to Paris, Malaysia filed an appeal for annulment of the final award with the Paris Court of Appeal. Although these were two separate proceedings, the central issue was the same in both instances: in the absence of an agreement between the parties, is it possible to confer jurisdiction on an arbitrator other than the one specifically designated in the arbitration agreement?

The exequatur proceeding was the first to address this issue. In a ruling dated 6 June 2023, affirmed by the Cour de cassation on 6 November 2024, the Paris Court of Appeal denied exequatur, holding that the parties’ intention was to submit their dispute for resolution to the British Consul General in Borneo, and that since that office no longer existed, the parties’ consent to arbitration had likewise ceased to exist.[6]

This issue was again referred to the Court, which issued its ruling on 9 December 2025.

Two preliminary questions arose. The first, which was also raised in the appeal against the order granting exequatur for the partial award,[7] concerned the admissibility of the appeal based on Article 1466 of the French Code of Civil Procedure.[8] The appellants argued that since Malaysia had not raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction in a timely manner before the arbitral tribunal, it was no longer entitled to raise it before the French courts. The Court rejected this motion to dismiss, ruling that, since Malaysia had refused to participate in the arbitration proceedings, it had necessarily contested the entire arbitration process.[9] It also rejected the argument based on estoppel, which prohibits a party from contradicting itself to the detriment of another party.[10] This new argument, raised for the first time by the heirs, was based on Malaysia’s payments of the royalty, which continued through 2013. They conclude that by paying this royalty without interruption since 1963 – the date on which Malaysia succeeded the original contracting party – Malaysia had consistently fulfilled the 1878 agreement. Consequently, they allege that Malaysia is contradicting itself to their detriment by suddenly raising the inapplicability of the dispute resolution clause.[11] The Court rejected this argument. Not only does the payment of the royalty provide no indication of Malaysia’s position regarding the arbitration clause, but estoppel also requires contradictory procedural conduct. However, in this case, the payment of the royalty did not occur within any specific procedural context, and cannot therefore serve as the basis for estoppel.[12]

The second issue concerned the binding effect of prior decisions by the Paris Court of Appeal and the Cour de cassation regarding the partial award. While the Court of Appeal acknowledges the identity of the parties, the cause of action, and the subject matter between the two proceedings – and thus the res judicata effect – it nevertheless holds that the issue before it no longer concerns the identification of the clause invoked as an arbitration clause, but rather the assessment of its scope and effectiveness.[13] Based on this reasoning, which has been subject to criticism,[14] the Court thus holds that it is not bound by its previous decision and reexamines the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.

Beyond these procedural considerations, the Court reaffirms its reasoning and ruling from 2023. Interpreting the arbitration clause on the basis of the parties’ common intent, as interpreted in accordance with the principles of good faith and practical effect, the Court held that recourse to the British Consul General in Borneo was consistent with the parties’ intent to entrust the resolution of their disputes to that specific office and that this constituted an integral part of the agreed mechanism. Consequently, the discontinuation of this office required a new agreement between the parties, which did not exist in this case. Therefore, the arbitral tribunal should not have declared itself competent, and the award is set aside in its entirety.[15]

Case law handed down by the Paris Court of Appeal over the past year has also served to refine the parameters of the review of an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction in investment matters. These parameters appear to favor the protection of awards.

Thus, in the Oschadbank case, the Paris Court of Appeal ruled on jurisdiction ratione temporis, ratione loci, and ratione materiae. In that case, the Ukrainian company Oschadbank claimed that its assets in Crimea had been expropriated following Russia’s annexation of that Ukrainian province in 2014. In an effort to obtain compensation, it initiated arbitration proceedings based on the bilateral investment treaty between Ukraine and Russia. The arbitral tribunal found a violation of that treaty and ordered Russia to pay approximately 1 billion U.S. dollars. Russia had challenged the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione temporis in an annulment proceeding. In this case, the Russian state’s consent was inferred from its standing offer of arbitration contained in the bilateral investment treaty between Russia and Ukraine, which entered into force on 27 January 2000, with Article 12 of that treaty providing that it applies to all investments made by investors of one contracting party in the territory of the other contracting party as of 1 January 1992. In a ruling dated 30 March 2021[16] , the Paris Court of Appeal had set aside the award, determining that Oschadbank’s activities in Crimea had begun prior to 1 January 1992.[17]

In a cassation ruling dated 7 December 2022, the Cour de cassation confirmed the principle of thorough review of jurisdiction, examining all legal and factual elements necessary to assess the scope of the arbitration agreement.[18] It then criticized the Court of Appeals on the grounds that, in this case, the time limitations regarding investments should not have been interpreted as a condition of jurisdiction ratione temporis.[19]

The case was thus referred to the Paris Court of Appeals again, which, in its decision of 1 July 2025, ruled on several grounds of appeal, including the claim that the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction ratione temporis, ratione loci, and ratione materiae. In this decision, the Court of Appeals logically aligns itself with the Cour de casssation. It therefore specifies that the scope of its review of jurisdiction in investment arbitration allows it to rely on all legal or factual elements relating to the scope of the arbitration agreement,[20] without reviewing the merits of the award.[21] Finally, it clarifies that, in the context of investment arbitration, the State’s consent stems from the offer of arbitration set forth in a treaty, which is directed at a specific category of investors and defined investments,[22] thereby limiting its review to these two concepts and excluding other issues frequently raised in this area, such as the legality of the investment.[23]

With regard to the review of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal continues to align itself with the Cour de cassation. It notes that the arbitration clause contained in the treaty does not include any condition regarding the date on which the investments were made, and that the time-related condition set forth in Article 12 of the treaty does not fall within its scope of review.[24] This is therefore not a question of jurisdiction but of admissibility, over which the Court has no authority.

The Court then examined jurisdiction ratione loci, as Russia argued that, due to Ukraine’s failure to recognize its sovereignty over Crimea, the investment could not be considered to have been made on the territory of the other country.[25] It dismisses any substantive examination of this issue, which it considers to fall within the scope of the treaty’s substantive protection, and merely notes that the assets were located on territory over which Russia claims sovereignty and exercises authority, thereby concluding that the territorial jurisdiction requirement attached to the concept of investment was satisfied.[26] Finally, regarding jurisdiction ratione materiae, the issue centered on whether the investment was initially made abroad, with Russia arguing that the investment in question was not foreign at the time it was made.[27] The Court held that the interpretation of the arbitration clause and the definition of investment does not impose a restriction to investments that were foreign from the outset.[28]

Furthermore, in the State of Kuwait case, the Paris Court of Appeal once again ruled on jurisdiction ratione personae in a decision dated 9 September 2025.[29] In that case, the claimant had initiated arbitration proceedings based on the bilateral treaty between Russia and Kuwait, alleging a violation of its rights in connection with criminal proceedings in Kuwait.[30] In an award rendered on 12 August 2022, the arbitral tribunal declared itself without jurisdiction, holding that while the claimant did indeed have the status of an investor, her management of and participation in a Kuwaiti private equity firm could not be classified as an investment.[31]

With regard to the review of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction, the Court reiterates the principles established in the Oschadbank case concerning the scope of its review.[32] It then examines the requirement that the treaty stipulates the investment must have been made by the investor itself. The Court thus notes that the definition of investment and the arbitration agreement contained in the treaty must be interpreted as requiring that the assets have been invested by the investor seeking substantive protection under the treaty.[33] It then points out that the claimant could not merely assert that it controlled a company in Kuwait without establishing that it had itself made an investment, and notes that, in any event, it failed to demonstrate that it controlled that company.[34]

II. The development of case law concerning public policy review

Over the past year, the annulment judge has also issued numerous rulings concerning the review of international public policy, thereby confirming and refining its already extensive case law on the subject.

First, we can mention two rulings handed down in corruption cases, in which the Paris Court of Appeals refined the scope of its review by adopting the arbitral tribunal’s analysis. In the Averda decision of 28 October 2025, the Paris Court of Appeal ruled on the consequences, under international public policy, of allegations of corruption that had tainted the performance of public contracts. The Court was hearing an appeal for annulment filed by the Gabonese Republic and two Gabonese municipalities against an award rendered on 23 August 2023, which concerned a dispute over contracts for waste management and street cleaning in Libreville.[35] These contracts had been entered into in December 2014 between Averda Environmental Services Gabon S.A. (“Averda Gabon”), a local subsidiary of the Lebanese waste management group, and several Gabonese public entities.

In August 2019, Averda Gabon suspended its services due to persistent payment delays before initiating arbitration proceedings in June 2020, seeking payment of outstanding invoices totaling approximately 34 million U.S. dollars. During the arbitration proceedings, the Gabonese entities alleged that corruption had permeated the performance of the contracts through the payment of bribes to a Gabonese public official.[36]

In its award of 23 August 2023, the arbitral tribunal determined that there was a body of serious, specific, and consistent evidence of acts of corruption committed during the performance of the underlying contracts,[37] and applied a 35% reduction to the amounts claimed in order to neutralize the effects of the corruption.[38] The Gabonese entities then filed an appeal for annulment pursuant to Article 1520, 5° of the French Code of Civil Procedure, arguing that recognition or enforcement of the award would allow Averda Gabon to benefit from contracts whose performance had been tainted by corruption, in violation of international public policy.[39]

In dismissing the appeal, the Paris Court of Appeal reiterated the principle of the concrete effect of a violation of international public policy, according to which annulment is warranted “only if it is demonstrated by serious, specific, and consistent evidence that the incorporation of the award into the domestic legal system would have the effect of giving force to a contract obtained through corruption or of allowing a party to benefit from the proceeds of such activity”.[40] However, in this case, the Court had noted that the corruption had affected only the performance of the contracts and not their formation, and that the arbitral tribunal had ruled out, through a rigorous factual analysis, any enrichment of Averda Gabon – through the award against the respondents in the arbitration – as a result of corrupt practices.[41]

This ruling is significant in two respects. First, the Court clearly distinguishes between corruption affecting the formation of the contract and that affecting only its performance: when corruption affects only performance, the Court ruling on annulment does not invalidate the contract in its entirety but specifically isolates the corrupting effects in order to neutralize them. Second, the Court upholds the neutralization method applied by the arbitral tribunal and relies on the tribunal’s reasoning without conducting its own analysis of the facts. In doing so, legal scholars consider that the Court implicitly acknowledges that the methods employed in arbitration to examine allegations of corruption are incomparable to those at its disposal.[42]

In a 25 November 2025, ruling in the Flower of the East case, the Paris Court of Appeal confirmed this pragmatic approach to reviewing allegations of corruption. In this case, the dispute concerned the development of a luxury resort complex on the Iranian island of Kish between the Kish Free Zone Organization – the Iranian public authority responsible for the development of this zone – and Flower of the East Kish Development Company (“Flower of the East”), whose contracts had been terminated by the Kish Free Zone Organization.[43] Flower of the East and its shareholder had initiated arbitration proceedings to seek a ruling against the Kish Free Zone Organization. In an award dated 10 March 2022, the tribunal awarded Flower of the East damages totaling nearly 40 million euros.[44] The Kish Free Zone Organization filed an appeal to set aside the award, based in particular on Article 1520, 5° of the French Code of Civil Procedure, and more specifically on the grounds that the claims resulting from the award were the proceeds of criminal offenses.[45]

In this case, the Court of Appeals examined the various elements put forward by the appellant to determine whether they constituted serious, specific, and consistent evidence of corruption. The appellant first relied on Iranian criminal decisions that had found collusion in public transactions and argued, in particular, that the financial terms and contractual guarantees – which, it was claimed, were not backed by financial guarantees – were abnormally advantageous to the company Flower of the East and its shareholder, which were indicators of collusion.[46] On the first point, the Court of Appeal finds that the appellant merely repeats elements mentioned in the Iranian decisions – which, the Court notes, can only have legal effect if they are recognized in France[47] – without establishing them.[48] Regarding the second point, the Court considers that this falls within the scope of a substantive debate that it is not within its purview to review and notes that this argument was not raised before the arbitral tribunal.[49] This clarification is interesting because, even though the Court is not bound by the arbitral tribunal’s decision, it deems it useful to take this fact into account in order to note the absence of any evidence of corruption.[50] In other words, even though they are unlikely to have the aforementioned Article 1466 of the French Code of Civil Procedure raised against them, the parties to the arbitration are encouraged by the Court to raise their allegations of corruption before the arbitrators. The Court then examines the argument that the formal process for concluding the contract with a public authority was not followed, but notes here as well that the evidence presented before the arbitral tribunal does not constitute serious, specific, and consistent indications of breaches of integrity.[51] Finally, it finds that the Tehran Court of Appeal’s approach to establishing the offense of collusion also fails to establish a sufficient body of evidence.[52]

Case law has also examined various forms of violations of public policy beyond allegations of corruption. In the Abante decision of 13 January 2026, the Paris Court of Appeal examined several allegations of a violation of public policy related to allegations of misuse of corporate assets, tax fraud and corruption, procedural fraud, violation of the right to the statute of limitations and the right to be tried within a reasonable time, and violation of the principle of equality of the parties.[53] In this case, the Court was hearing an appeal against an order granting exequatur to an award rendered on 16 September 2022, in favor of Abante Holdings Limited (“Abante”) in connection with a proposed acquisition of a Swiss company as part of a real estate development project.[54]

In support of its argument that the award violated international public policy, the appellant contended that the award obtained by Abante was based on unlawful acts committed by Abante, including misuse of corporate assets, initial payments originating from third-party companies, tax fraud resulting from Abante’s unlawful enrichment, and a corrupt transaction involving the use of an offshore company. The appellant also argued that Abante had concealed its true identity. Finally, the appellant argued that, since the dispute arose in 2005, the award rendered in 2022 had disregarded his right to the statute of limitations and to a reasonable time for adjudication, and that the tribunal had violated the principle of equality by denying him a postponement for medical reasons and requiring him to appear via videoconference.[55]

On the first point, the Court found that the appellant failed to provide any evidence establishing tax fraud, since neither the payment of a debt determined by an award nor Abante’s domicile in a non-cooperative state is sufficient to establish such fraud.[56] Regarding the allegations of corruption, the Court also ruled that there was no evidence to support them. [57] Finally, regarding the misuse of corporate assets, the Court ruled that this does not fall within the scope of international public policy.[58] As for the allegations of procedural fraud, these are based on the fact that Abante allegedly provided a false registered address in connection with the proceedings. The Court noted, however, that Abante had merely indicated its tax domicile instead of its registered office, which does not constitute procedural fraud.[59]

On the third point, the Court reiterates that the fight against human rights violations – protected in particular by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966 – is part of French international public policy.[60] It holds, however, that the application of statutes of limitations cannot be contrary to international public policy.[61] With regard to the right to be tried within a reasonable time, this must be analyzed within the procedural framework. In this case, since the arbitration proceedings lasted only three years, this does not constitute an unreasonable delay.[62] Finally, regarding the violation of the principle of equality, the Court ruled that it had not been demonstrated how holding his hearing via videoconference would have prevented him from presenting his case and would have placed him at a substantial disadvantage.[63]

The aforementioned State of Kuwait decision also addresses a ground of public policy, concerning allegations of human rights violations. The Court first ruled, on the issue of the admissibility of this ground, that since the allegations fall under public policy of direction, the parties cannot waive their right to invoke them.[64] On the merits of the ground, the Court noted that the fight against human rights violations is part of French international public policy.[65] However, in the present case, the alleged violations of the appellant’s fundamental rights are said to have occurred in the context of criminal proceedings in Kuwait, but not in the context of the arbitration proceedings, during which she was able to be validly represented and defend her interests.[66] Consequently, since the appellant’s rights were respected during the arbitration proceedings, the Court finds that it has not been demonstrated that the recognition or enforcement of the award would violate international public policy.[67]

In the previously cited Oschadbank decision, Russia alleged procedural fraud, claiming that certain facts regarding the date of the investment had been concealed.[68] In rejecting this argument, however, the Court of Appeal noted that since the date of the investment was not deemed decisive to the arbitral tribunal’s reasoning, it cannot be considered that concealed facts would have influenced its decision through fraud.[69] The Court thus reiterates that it is not sufficient for fraud to be established; rather, it must also have influenced the arbitral tribunal’s decision.[70]

In the Blaise Boissons decision, the Paris Court of Appeal addressed economic issues, specifically the compliance of the award with Article L. 572-5 of the French Monetary and Financial Code, which imposes criminal penalties for the prohibition on the provision of payment services,[71] as well as the provisions of Directive 2015/2366 of 25 November 2015, on payment services in the internal market, known as PSD2, insofar as they contribute to the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing. The dispute stems from the purchase of bottles of vodka by Blaise Boissons Conseil Distribution (“Blaise Boissons”) from an Irish company. The goods were stored on the premises of Loendersloot Internationale Expeditie (“LIE”), and the purchase price had been paid by Sticheting Loendersloot Finance (“SLF”) acting as an intermediary.[72] The goods were seized on grounds of counterfeiting and were destroyed. Blaise Boissons initiated arbitration proceedings against LIE and SLF to seek compensation for the price of the goods and the costs of destruction.[73] The award rendered on 12 June 2024, dismissed Blaise Boissons’s claims. Since this award was declared enforceable in France, Blaise Boissons filed an appeal against the order of enforcement.[74]

The appellant raised a single ground of appeal based on a violation of public policy, arguing that SLF was not authorized to provide payment services, even though it must be considered a service provider within the meaning of the PSD2 Directive. Consequently, Blaise Boissons argued that enforcement of the award would have rendered the provisions of Article L. 572-5 of the French Monetary and Financial Code inoperative.[75]

After rejecting the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents on the basis of Article 1466 of the French Code of Civil Procedure,[76] the Court ruled on the merits of the argument. The Court noted that the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing forms part of French international public policy, the effects of which must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.[77] In this regard, it clarifies that it is not its role to verify whether the respondents’ activities comply with the provisions governing the provision of payment services, but only to determine whether the recognition or enforcement of the award is likely to hinder the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing by allowing a party to benefit from the proceeds of such activities. The Court ruled that the appellant failed to demonstrate how the arbitral tribunal’s decision significantly impedes the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing, and dismissed the appeal.[78]

Finally, in the SCIZ decision of 4 November 2025, the Paris Court of Appeals ruled on the review of the award in light of a foreign mandatory law. In this case, the Court heard an appeal of an order granting exequatur to an award rendered in Algiers in a dispute concerning a contract for the management of the operations of SCIZ, an Algerian state-owned enterprise, entrusted to the Egyptian company ASEC Cement, which had also acquired shares in SCIZ.[79] SCIZ argued that ASEC Cement had failed to meet its production targets and sought late-payment interest from it, while ASEC Cement contended that its failure to meet those targets was attributable to SCIZ.[80] The award of 13 January 2023, ordered SCIZ to pay damages in the amount of 60 million U.S. dollars for breach of contract.[81]

In support of its argument that the award violated international public policy, SCIZ contended that the arbitral tribunal, in assessing its contractual liability, had failed to take into account the applicability of Algerian public procurement rules and procedures.[82] The Court reiterated its case law holding that a failure to recognize a foreign mandatory law may lead to the annulment of an award if that mandatory law protects a value or principle recognized under French international public policy, and if the award both violates the foreign mandatory law and constitutes a clear infringement of a principle or value falling within the scope of international public policy.[83] In this case, the Court notes that SCIZ has not demonstrated any violation of Algerian public procurement regulations or of an equivalent principle under French public policy, nor has it established any infringement thereof.[84]

To round out this review, it is worth mentioning the Dilas ruling handed down by the Paris Court of Appeals on 16 December 2025, regarding internal arbitration.[85] This dispute concerned the conclusion of several contracts by Dilas and its shareholders with ITM Entreprises and its subsidiaries, the operator of the Les Mousquetaires group. Due to contractual difficulties following the group’s integration as a franchisee, Dilas initiated internal arbitration proceedings, which resulted in an award dated December 26, 2023, that largely dismissed the claimants’ requests.[86]

In support of its motion to set aside the award, Dilas argued, among other things, that the award had failed to address its arguments regarding the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements.[87] The Court rejected this argument, noting that the arbitral tribunal had ruled on these points in its award and had determined that there was no evidence of a violation of competition law.[88] The significance of this ruling, however, lies in the scope of the review exercised by the annulment court regarding violations of domestic public policy. Indeed, the Court of Appeal specifies that this review “must be conducted based on the facts and legal principles relied upon by the arbitrators in their award, taking into account the arguments presented before them”,[89] contrary to international case law, which tends to examine external factors.[90]

Finally, in the EOVA decision of 23 September 2025, the Court ruled not on a claim based on a violation of international public policy, but on a stay of proceedings related to criminal matters. On appeal from an order issued by the pre-trial judge, the company EOVA sought a stay of proceedings due to the filing of a complaint, with a civil claim, alleging forgery and use of forged documents, as well as fraud in obtaining a judgment, in connection with service of process documents relating to the arbitration proceedings.[91] The Court ruled, however, that since no criminal proceedings had been initiated, and since, in any event, the action pending before it did not concern the redress of a criminal offense, there was no basis for a stay of proceedings, especially since the Court is well-founded in assessing for itself the authenticity of the documents alleged to be forged.[92] It adopts the same position regarding a forgery proceeding filed before the Paris Judicial Court against the exequatur order, which reiterates the arguments set forth in the complaint and in the proceedings pending before the Court of Appeals.[93] Consequently, and in light of its own jurisdiction over the verification of handwriting, the Court does not consider that the proper administration of justice justifies a stay of proceedings. The Court’s objective is to ensure the efficient and prompt handling of appeals filed against arbitral awards or their exequatur.

III. The TotalEnergies case: an illustration of potentially fraudulent uses of  arbitration

On 19 March 2026, the 15^th Criminal Chamber of the Nanterre Court ruled on the case involving an alleged attempt to defraud the TotalEnergies group of 22 billion U.S. dollars through an arbitration proceeding. All of the defendants were acquitted, but the Nanterre Public Prosecutor’s Office has reportedly indicated its intention to appeal.[94] This case highlights the risks of manipulation surrounding arbitration and criminal proceedings.

The dispute stems from an oil exploration agreement entered into in 1992 between Elf Neftegaz, a Russian subsidiary of Elf Aquitaine (later acquired by TotalEnergies), and the local authorities of Volgograd and Saratov. This agreement never entered into force, and Elf notified its counterparty that the contract had lapsed. Nevertheless, in 2009, the Russian local authorities, together with the Russian company Interneft, initiated arbitration proceedings based on the arbitration clause contained in the 1992 agreement. The Russian parties sought more than 22 billion U.S. dollars, alleging that Elf Neftegaz had failed to fulfill its contractual obligations.[95] Other, unsuccessful, legal actions had also been brought before French courts by André Guelfi – an intermediary used by Elf in the transactions in question – seeking payment of commissions (totaling 2 billion euros), and by the Russian Olympic Committee, acting on behalf of André Guelfi, seeking compensation of 276 million euros.[96]

The formation of the arbitral tribunal itself was at the heart of the contested arrangement, allegedly carried out to ensure TotalEnergies’ liability. Since Elf Neftegaz was a liquidated legal entity, it was necessary to appoint an ad hoc administrator to represent it in the arbitration proceedings. The Commercial Court had appointed the judicial administrator Charles-Henri Carboni, who in turn selected Jean-Pierre Mattei, a lawyer and former president of the Paris Commercial Court, as the arbitrator representing Elf Neftegaz’s interests, before the co-arbitrators appointed the tribunal’s president, Andreas Reiner.

According to TotalEnergies, it had been unable to participate in this appointment on its own behalf. The oil major was all the more critical of this appointment because the arbitral tribunal was allegedly constituted even though the appointment of the court-appointed administrator had not yet been confirmed.[97] According to TotalEnergies, it was due to these legal setbacks that André Guelfi allegedly initiated this arbitration proceeding in order to extract compensation from the company.[98]

Despite the complaint filed by Total and the opening of a judicial investigation in May 2011, the arbitration proceedings continued. The arbitrators all resigned, and new ones were appointed. The proceedings ultimately resulted in a final award dismissing the Russian parties’ claims.[99]

Ultimately, seven people were referred to the Nanterre Criminal Court on separate charges. Lawyers Olivier Pardo and Xavier Cazottes, who represented the Russian parties, were charged  – in addition to attempted fraud – for actively bribing an international arbitrator and actively bribing a public official – in this case, the court-appointed administrator Charles-Henri Carboni – who was accused of appointing Jean-Pierre Mattei despite knowing of his close ties to André Guelfi. Lawyer François Binet, a former contractor for TotalEnergies, was charged with attempted fraud due to alleged “double-dealing” that led him to maintain close ties simultaneously with the company and with Jean-Pierre Mattei.[100] The prosecution had sought substantial sentences: five years in prison, including three years without parole, and a 500,000-euro fine for Jean-Pierre Mattei – described as the “front man” for André Guelfi’s schemes – and sentences ranging from a two-year suspended sentence to three years in prison without parole for the other defendants.[101]

In a ruling dated 19 March 2026, the Nanterre Criminal Court acquitted all seven defendants. The Court first noted that resorting to the courts, including arbitration, cannot in itself constitute fraud, while acknowledging that a proceeding may serve as a cover for a scam.[102] It also found that the elements constituting the offense of fraud were absent, in that TotalEnergies was aware of the proceedings, participated in them, and had not been taken by surprise.[103]