On 3 January 2026, United States special forces arrested Nicolás Maduro in Caracas (Venezuela) as part of the operation known as “Absolute Resolve.” Transferred to the United States together with his wife, the Venezuelan president is facing charges before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, including conspiracy to engage in narco-terrorism, allegations he has publicly denied.[1]

In the hours following the operation, the President of the United States announced the opening of a political transition phase supervised by Washington, as well as his intention to facilitate access for American oil companies to Venezuela’s energy resources. Venezuela is holding the largest proven oil reserves in the world.[2] This intervention took place in a context of increased economic pressure, in the form of sanctions, notably from the U.S., targeting the oil sector and aimed at restricting the revenues of the Venezuelan State.[3]

Tensions between Venezuela and foreign investors, particularly U.S. investors, originate in the nationalisation policies implemented from the 1970s, which led to the expropriation of numerous assets and to a multiplication of international arbitration proceedings,[4] in particular before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). More than fifty proceedings have been brought against Venezuela, with some cases still pending.[5]

Since then, the Venezuelan State has systematically challenged the enforcement of arbitral awards rendered against it, leaving numerous claims unpaid.[6] In this context, the U.S. intervention of January 2026 appears as a break in the status quo, liable to redefine both geopolitical balance and the legal prospects for the recovery of claims arising from investment arbitration.

I. The situation of Venezuela in the field of investment arbitration prior to the U.S. intervention

Prior to the U.S. intervention, Venezuela was already at the centre of a dense arbitral caseload, characterised in particular by the recurring difficulty in enforcing arbitral awards rendered against the Venezuelan State.

A. A massive arbitral caseload resulting from waves of expropriations

During the first half of the twentieth century, Venezuela welcomed numerous Western companies to exploit its oil-rich soil. However, in order to protect its resources, Venezuela introduced a new legal framework imposing an equal sharing of oil profits between operators and the State (the so-called “fifty-fifty” law).[7] This was followed in the 1970s by a form of nationalisation of the oil sector that had already given rise to initial disputes between foreign investors and the South American State.[8] Nevertheless, investors remained in place and new actors even entered the market until oil prices skyrocketed in 2004. This surge led Venezuela, in 2006, to compel foreign multinationals to renegotiate their contracts and to enter into joint ventures controlled by the State oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA). This new shift, regarded by some as abrupt and unacceptable, notably prompted the two main U.S. multinationals, ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil, to leave Venezuela and to initiate international arbitration proceedings to seek compensation for the seizure of their assets.[9]

The best illustration of this wave of challenges is that of ConocoPhillips, a U.S. multinational specialising in oil extraction, transportation, and processing. During the 1990s, the company invested in Venezuela, through subsidiaries established in the Netherlands, in three projects relating to the production, partial refining, and oil sales. In 2007, Venezuela sought to restructure the various projects into companies in which the Venezuelan State oil company, PDVSA, would hold a 60% stake. ConocoPhillips rejected the terms of the restructuring agreement and, as a result, withdrew from the Venezuelan market. Subsequently, PDVSA nationalised the projects concerned.[10]

On 2 November 2007, the U.S. company initiated arbitration proceedings against Venezuela. It alleged unlawful expropriation as well as a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard set out in the Netherlands–Venezuela Bilateral Investment Treaty (hereinafter the BIT). In 2013, the arbitral tribunal initially found that Venezuela had failed to negotiate a fair compensation in good faith. In March 2019, the tribunal ultimately awarded the claimant USD 8.4 billion[11] for unlawful expropriation in breach of the BIT and USD 286 million for discriminatory measures taken in violation of a joint venture agreement.[12]

Beyond the oil industry, the international arbitrations brought against Venezuela form part of a broader phenomenon. The multiplication of expropriations, including in sectors other than energy[13], has indeed led to a significant arbitral caseload,[14] the recognition and enforcement of the resulting awards having subsequently been systematically challenged by the Venezuelan State.[15]

B. The systemic refusal by Venezuela to recognize and enforce arbitral awards

Initially, in 2012, Venezuela, a signatory to the ICSID Convention, denounced it in accordance with the letter of Article 71 thereof.[16] Through this denunciation, Venezuela intended to signal its intention to withdraw from a significant part of the investment arbitration system.

Moreover, the Venezuelan State has multiplied strategies aimed at obstructing the enforcement of arbitral decisions, in particular by challenging the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals in several cases and by seeking to have awards rendered against it set aside.[17]

In Paris, for example, the Court of Appeal was seized of an application to set aside an arbitral award on jurisdiction filed by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, illustrating this procedural tactic aimed at delaying or eliminating the enforcement of decisions in favor of investors. The Court rejected all the pleas in law, emphasising that, the arbitral tribunal had rightly upheld its jurisdiction, that it had ruled within the scope of its mandate, and that there had been no violation of international public policy.[18]

By failing to comply with the arbitral awards rendered against it, Venezuela has become a debtor of unpaid international claims, notably vis-à-vis U.S. investors. Consequently, the various creditors are now seeking to recover billions of dollars.[19]

II. The influence of U.S. geopolitical action on investor protection

The U.S. intervention in Venezuela goes beyond the purely political or security sphere and could enhance, in the eyes of the South-American State’s creditors, the effectiveness of mechanisms for investor protection and recovery of international claims. By mobilising sanctions, conditional easing measures, support for new authorities, and control over oil flows, the United States is equipping itself with a potential lever to promote the enforcement of awards obtained by its nationals.[20] Such a dynamic raises both the question of new extrajudicial avenues for recovery and that of its compatibility with the fundamental principles of international law.

A. The emergence of new avenues for the recovery of U.S. claims

The operation has contributed to the resumption of trade between Venezuela and the United States, thereby enhancing prospects for the recovery of claims. This stems both from a general improvement in the economic situation and from reinvestments negotiated under various settlement agreements. Indeed, following the capture of Nicolás Maduro, the United States has already carried out its first sale of Venezuelan oil, valued at approximately USD 500 million.[21]

Thus, the renewed flow of Venezuelan oil exports to Western markets could enable investors to recover all or part of their assets. Moreover, the establishment of new authorities fuels hopes for more opportunities for negotiation and, consequently, for full or partial recovery of claims. The appointment of Delcy Rodríguez, acting president with political backing from Donald Trump, indeed appears to satisfy the U.S. authorities.[22]

On 9 January, the Venezuelan National Assembly adopted a hydrocarbons law aimed at enabling the return of private investors to the exploitation of the country’s oil resources. At the same time, Washington announced the partial suspension of the sectoral sanctions in force since 2019. Finally, on Saturday 31 January, with the agreement of the United States, Venezuela and India concluded an energy cooperation agreement.[23]

The lifting of sanctions de facto allows U.S. companies to trade with PDVSA. Analysts therefore expect the foreign-currency inflows generated by the oil sector to bring inflation to a halt.[24]

Finally, the prices of Venezuelan debt instruments in default rose by nearly 30% following the U.S. intervention, generating exceptional gains for hedge funds and other investors who had acquired these bonds and wished to resell them. In default since 2017, Venezuelan sovereign bonds thus saw their value increase from approximately 33 cents to 42 cents per dollar following the U.S. measures. This development illustrates the clear relevance of a secondary market for these claims.[25]

B. The questions raised by the U.S. intervention

The systemic implications of this approach should be considered, insofar as a doctrine of State intervention explicitly or implicitly aimed at the recovery of international claims could be perceived as setting precedents. Indeed, the combined use of diplomatic, economic, and military tools to facilitate or accelerate the enforcement of claims raises the question of the possible normalization of such a mechanism beyond the Venezuelan case alone, at the risk of weakening the traditional multilateral legal frameworks for dispute settlement.

From this perspective, the question arises as to whether this represents the emergence of a form of interventionist policy geared towards the recovery of sovereign or quasi-sovereign claims held by States or their nationals. Such a development would mark a significant shift in international financial disputes, by substituting jurisdictional mechanisms based on consent and the sovereign equality of States with power-based strategies liable to redefine the interplay between international investment law, the enforcement of awards, and international relations.

This interventionist U.S. policy raises questions under international law, insofar as the use of force or coercion to alter a State’s domestic policy or to obtain an economic advantage is prohibited in the absence of justification based on self-defence or a mandate from the United Nations Security Council. In short, this practice runs counter to the rules governing the use of force and the sovereignty of States over their natural resources.[26]