Part 1: Comparative overview of review mechanisms of GRECO, the OECD, and the UNODC

1. Evaluation mechanisms pursuing a common goal but with different approaches

Since the mid-1990s, thanks to a growing awareness of the need for a stronger, concerted response and comprehensive response to corruption, several mechanisms have been put in place under the aegis of various international organizations to assess national legal and institutional frameworks for combating corruption.

While these mechanisms pursue a common goal, they differ in their implementation methods, which can sometimes be quite significant. Some are part of a strategy to combat transnational corruption, aiming to promote fairer competition between major exporting economies; others focus on capacity building developing countries or least developed countries; finally, some emphasize the role of public institutions in their ability to prevent the phenomenon. Peer and public pressure, induced by critical evaluation reports and demanding follow-up on recommendations addressed to States, is an important lever for some mechanisms, while it is limited or even marginal in others.

The commitment of States to these mechanisms also varies, depending on the strength of their political will to fight corruption, the resources available, the political or economic context, and their sensitivity to the pressure exerted by recommendations made by multilateral bodies. Many see these mechanisms primarily as a tool to support their internal reforms, while others also view them as instruments of influence to encourage more ambitious anti-corruption policies among their foreign partners, in the service of their strategic interests or diplomatic action.

2. Evaluation mechanisms with contrasting scopes of action

The scope of the mechanisms created is global or regional. Their main purpose may be to combat corruption or to address closely related issues. This study focuses on those in which France is involved and which are specifically dedicated to combating corruption:

• the Mechanism for the Review of Implementation of the 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption (known as the “Merida Convention”), which began its work in 2010 and assesses the compliance of the rules and practices of the States Parties with the provisions of the Convention;

• the Group of States against Corruption (hereinafter “GRECO”), created in 1999, which assesses its member States regarding the anti-corruption standards of the Council of Europe as well as other international standards (the scope of reference varies depending on the theme of the evaluation cycle);

• the Working Group on Bribery of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-OECD (hereinafter referred to as the “WGB”), which assesses the implementation of the 1997 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and related instruments (in particular, the recommendation of November 26, 2009, aimed at strengthening the fight against bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions, revised at the end of 2021).

The number of States Parties and therefore the geographical scope covered by each mechanism varies significantly:

• 190 States and the European Union are parties to the Merida Convention, which is, as such, the most universal anti-corruption convention;

• GRECO has 48 member States, mainly European (all member States of the Council of Europe have joined), but also the United States and Kazakhstan, as membership is open to all ;

• the 1997 Convention of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been ratified by 46 countries (including eight non-OECD members), representing more than two-thirds of global exports and nearly 90% of total foreign direct investment.

3. Progressive or thematic evaluation procedures for the fight against corruption

With regard to the Implementation Review Mechanism (IRM) of the Merida Convention, assessments are organized in cycles corresponding to the different chapters of the convention (given the large number of provisions and their broad thematic scope, assessing the entire convention at once was deemed extremely complex, if not impossible):

• a first cycle began in 2010, covering chapters III and IV of the Convention, relating to the criminalization, detection, and punishment of corruption and international cooperation;

• a second cycle began in 2015, covering chapters II and IV of the Convention, relating to measures to prevent corruption and the recovery of assets.

With regard to GRECO, evaluations of States are carried out not only on the basis of the application of the reference text, but also on the basis of specific themes. To date, six evaluation cycles have been initiated:

• 1^st cycle: national bodies involved in preventing and combating corruption, immunities;
• 2^nd cycle: identification, seizure, and confiscation of the proceeds of corruption;
• 3^rd cycle: criminalization; transparency of political party financing;
• 4^th cycle: prevention of corruption among parliamentarians, judges, and prosecutors;
• 5^th cycle: prevention of corruption and promotion of integrity within central governments and law enforcement agencies;
• 6^th cycle: prevention of corruption and promotion of integrity at the subnational level.

Within the framework of the WGB, four phases of evaluation have been implemented to date:

• Phase 1 consists of assessing the compliance of national legislation with the convention;
• Phase 2 is designed to assess the effective implementation of this legislation;
• Phase 3 focuses primarily on progress made on weaknesses identified in Phase 2 and legislative or institutional changes that have occurred since then;
• Phase 4 focuses in particular on implementation efforts and results, as well as key cross-cutting issues.

4. Developing recommendations on necessary reforms: between co-construction, cooperation, and oversight

With regard to GRECO, for each evaluation report, a dedicated team visits the country concerned (on the basis of a preliminary questionnaire) and, at the end of the visit, prepares a report (with recommendations) in conjunction with the GRECO secretariat, which is then submitted to the GRECO plenary meeting for discussion and adoption. For “compliance” reports (which assess progress in implementing the recommendations made in the initial evaluation report), adoption is subject to a simplified procedure (without a country visit), but the report is always adopted at a GRECO plenary meeting.

Although the States under evaluation can defend their position during the session, most of the recommendations contained in the provisional report are often adopted in plenary session, without the state concerned being able to block them. This is one of the guarantees that the report will actually be adopted by GRECO, even if the state concerned can put forward its position, and this until the plenary session.

Under both the IRM and the WGB, two States are responsible for evaluating a third, under the supervision and coordination of teams from the respective secretariats of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the OECD. This process is based on a structured exchange of questions and answers and information sharing between the State being evaluated and its evaluators. At the end of the process, a draft report is drawn up, which outlines the implementation of relevant norms and standards, any good practices, and recommendations for reforms to be undertaken in order to address any shortcomings identified. However, a major difference between these two mechanisms lies in the way in which the draft reports are finalized. Within the WGB, these are discussed line by line by all members of the group, who are invited to participate in debates involving the delegations of the State under review and its evaluators on the relevance of the recommendations made and the identification of good practices identified during the review. Decisions are based on the principle of “consensus minus one.”

Conversely, under the IRM, discussions on draft reports and their conclusions are limited to the State under review and its evaluators. Once finalized, these conclusions are published in the form of analytical summaries and shared during sessions of the Merida Convention Implementation Review Group, an intergovernmental working group responsible for evaluating the performance of the mechanism, which meets in Vienna, Austria, several times a year. However, this Group does not discuss the content of these analytical summaries. While there is no rule prohibiting a national delegation from commenting on another State’s assessment summary during discussions, these exchanges do not constitute a forum for negotiation among all States Parties on the relevance of the assessment conclusions. This exercise is undoubtedly important, but it is more difficult to envisage in a setting where discussions can be strongly influenced by political considerations—particularly in the UN context, even if such considerations are not absent from discussions in the WGB and GRECO—and, above all, bringing together 191 delegations

The IRM also has another important feature: during country reviews, it assesses any technical assistance needs for the proper implementation of the provisions under review. This aspect reflects one of the central objectives of the mechanism, which is to support States Parties—many of which are developing countries or less developed economies—in the effective implementation of the Convention, to be “neither accusatory nor punitive,” and to take “into account the level of development of States Parties.”

5. The uneven but growing inclusion of non-governmental actors

The IRM mechanism is an intergovernmental process, and the question of including other stakeholders in the assessments depends above all on the willingness of the State being assessed. In practice, however, it appears that the vast majority of country reviews conducted to date have involved exchanges with organizations and actors outside the national authorities: 89% of the first cycle country reviews and 98% of the second cycle reviews involved non-governmental stakeholders. This openness varies from one State to another, and its extent depends largely on the national context and the degree of transparency that the State under review is willing to adopt.

Conversely, within the WGB, consideration of other stakeholders’ views is part of a structured and, to some extent, more mature process. For example, as part of France’s Phase 4 evaluation, the evaluators interviewed representatives of the accounting and auditing professions, employer and professional organizations, private companies, representatives of the legal professions, as well as members of civil society and journalists.

In the case of GRECO, key civil society actors in the country concerned are heard by the GRECO evaluation team during the preparation of each initial evaluation report, and the comments of civil society representatives remain confidential in order to guarantee their freedom of speech.

After several years of implementation, the diversity of approaches to peer review mechanisms raises questions about their respective successes and limitations. The proliferation of evaluations may also give rise to concerns about confusion and sometimes result in overlapping evaluations, despite efforts to achieve synergies between mechanisms.

Part 2: Follow-up on adopted recommendations and concrete impacts in the fight against corruption

1. Strict and systematic monitoring as the preferred means of ensuring effective implementation of the conclusions of evaluations

A major difference between the mechanisms of peer reviews in dedicated multilateral forums in the fight against corruption lies in the way in which the follow-up to country reviews is organized. Both within the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and the OECD Working Group on Bribery (WGB), the approach adopted to ensure the effective implementation of the conclusions of the evaluation of national anti-corruption frameworks is based on exerting structured pressure on the evaluated State and its authorities.

This pressure is based primarily on systematic and regular monitoring of the implementation of recommendations addressed to States. In the GRECO process, each initial evaluation is systematically followed by a compliance procedure designed to assess the measures taken by the evaluated State to follow up on the recommendations made. This phase results in an initial compliance report adopted two years after the initial evaluation, which may be supplemented, if necessary, by a second compliance report 18 months later. Similarly, within the framework of the WGB, systematic monitoring is carried out two years after the main evaluation and results in a public written report. Oral follow-up after one year may be required for certain more urgent recommendations, which has now become well-established practice. The Group may also decide to extend the follow-up beyond the two-year report. While the technical review of the information provided by the evaluated State is carried out by the same team of two evaluating States assisted by the secretariat, the follow-up is a collective process. The Group examines the information provided and the evaluators’ conclusions, adopts the follow-up reports, and decides, where appropriate, on further steps. These collegial decision-making processes are in themselves a means of peer pressure, while contributing to harmonized evaluation between States and, consequently, to the legitimacy of the follow-up measures adopted.

This pressure also stems from the possibility of graduated measures in the event of non-compliance. In particular, the WGB may invite the State under review to submit a detailed and operational action plan, as it did with Poland in 2024; decide to send technical or high-level missions, as it did with Switzerland in 2025 and Peru in 2025; publish a statement noting the State’s non-compliance with its obligations under the Convention; or issue a “due diligence warning,” signaling that insufficient implementation of the Convention may justify strengthening due diligence obligations with respect to the private sector in the State concerned. The mere prospect of its adoption, necessarily preceded by a confidential warning in the context of the Group’s discussions, certainly encourages the expected reforms. At GRECO, a special procedure is provided for members whose implementation of the recommendations was deemed “generally unsatisfactory” following the initial evaluation report and two compliance reports (as well as another specific, independent procedure, if GRECO receives reliable information indicating that “institutional reform, legislative initiative, or procedural change › in a member State could lead to a serious violation of a Council of Europe anti-corruption standard).

Finally, this pressure is further reinforced by the systematic publication of evaluation and follow-up reports, their wide dissemination, and the release of press releases accompanying the adoption of the above-mentioned measures. Regular monitoring also makes it possible to adapt to national legislative and institutional developments.

It is largely because this approach has proven its usefulness that it has fueled discussions on the evolution of the terms of the Implementation Review Mechanism (IRM) of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, known as the Merida Convention, as part of the definition of its next evaluation phase. This was launched at the Conference of the States Parties, held in Doha, Qatar, last December, with the first reviews expected by 2028.

Until now, under the IRM, the State being evaluated has had several means of reporting on the measures taken to implement the recommendations addressed to it. The forums for discussion provided by the Implementation Review Group and the thematic working groups attached to the Merida Convention allow for the presentation of the reforms undertaken. The State can also request the publication of information on its dedicated page on the UNODC website. However, this mechanism is based exclusively on voluntary initiatives, at the discretion of the States Parties; it is neither systematic nor accompanied by mechanisms to encourage the effective implementation of the conclusions of the country reviews.

For the next phase of the IRM, several changes have nevertheless been incorporated into the mechanism’s procedures, which will enable systematic and transparent monitoring of the implementation of the recommended reforms and increase the visibility of this work. States will be required to submit information every two years on the follow-up to their country reviews, and this information will be published. A scorecard of assistance needs identified in the country reviews and the support provided will also be created and updated regularly, thereby strengthening the monitoring of actions for more effective implementation of the Merida Convention

2. The limitations of an approach based primarily on pressure on national authorities

While strong pressure on national authorities through these mechanisms and “naming and shaming” are undoubtedly a lever for reform, and without denying that such reforms sometimes take a long time, the persistence of certain shortcomings identified several years ago in WGB and GRECO member States nevertheless raises the question of the limitations of such an approach.

To give just a few examples, on January 16, the WGB published data for all member states of the Group and parties to the OECD Convention on civil, criminal, or administrative sanctions imposed, or not imposed, on individuals and legal entities. While the WGB notes that “25 parties have collectively convicted or sanctioned at least 752 individuals and 31 legal entities for acts of bribery of foreign officials in criminal proceedings” and that “7 parties have collectively sanctioned 66 individuals and 135 legal entities in civil or administrative proceedings,” these figures reveal that implementation remains weak, if not non-existent, in more than 20 States Parties (out of 46), some of which nevertheless acceded to the Convention in the early 2000s. At GRECO, many States (including France) have been subject to special or urgent procedures with regard to the implementation of recommendations deemed “generally unsatisfactory,” notably for the urgent procedure in Poland and Romania in 2018, Greece in 2019, Slovenia in 2020, and the Slovak Republic in 2025.

The effectiveness of pressure exerted on States to implement recommendations effectively depends heavily on their degree of receptiveness. France offers an example of uneven receptiveness in this regard, as can be seen from the political reactions to some particularly critical assessments of the national anti-corruption system. The WGB’s Phase 3 evaluation report on France, adopted on October 12, 2012, undoubtedly served more than previous evaluations as the starting point for a political reaction that ultimately led to substantial reforms of the national anti-corruption framework.

This receptiveness is reinforced when this pressure can be relayed by other actors, particularly those from civil society, notably through significant media coverage of the criticisms made. The high profile given to the WGB and GRECO review and monitoring reports, and in another context, the FATF, is structurally one of the main strengths of these mechanisms. It is in line with this approach that the publicity of review reports will be enhanced during the transition to the next phase of the IRM, through the publication of a press release at the end of country reviews, although it should be noted that this will be on a voluntary basis. In any case, whether this publicity is voluntary or systematic, the pressure exerted quickly reaches its limits in national contexts where there is a lack of support, whether due to a weakened civil society that is not very active on these issues, insufficient coverage by the mainstream media, or a media that is sometimes very conciliatory.

The effectiveness of the pressure applied also necessarily varies according to the political context and may have no effect in the absence of political will. It also varies according to the national economic context: institutional reform and the development of a legal framework are not just a matter of political will that can be achieved through rigorous monitoring, but also depend on the resources available, especially when it comes to structural reforms in developing economies. This issue is certainly central to the implementation of the Merida Convention, which has 191 States Parties, in addition to the European Union, with very contrasting levels of development. The logic underlying the IRM of supporting national reforms, rather than “naming and shaming,” in particular by identifying technical assistance needs in the context of country reviews, an approach often criticized for its lack of structured, firm, and transparent follow-up, has nevertheless also been the driving force behind important national reforms, for example through the creation of criminal offenses for several forms of breaches of integrity in Bolivia, Paraguay, and Angola, or through the strengthening of the judicial authorities’ capacity to detect and prosecute corruption in Ghana and Malaysia.

In conclusion, while there is no perfect formula for these peer review mechanisms, they remain effective, albeit relatively so. All must now evolve in an uncertain multilateral context, marked by the disengagement of the United States, which may also imply a reduction in the resources necessary for their proper functioning. While the States Parties to the Merida Convention have agreed to strengthen the IRM in its next phase, the challenge now is to translate the negotiated terms into effective concrete action. The WGB will in turn soon have to determine the contours of its fifth evaluation phase, in a context of expansion to new countries such as Ukraine, Indonesia, and Thailand. In both cases – concerning the prevention of corruption and promotion, and in the other, concerning the prevention of corruption and promotion -, the challenge is to find the right balance between integrity within subnational authorities, while the cost of demanding and regular peer reviews and that many of the recommendations of the 5th cycle are not yet adequate modalities compromising their impact. Regarding the GRECO, it will face a busy schedule with the recent adoption of a new thematic evaluation cycle (6^th cycle), knowing that recommendations of the 5^th cycle are not all implemented, and some States have not yet completed GRECO previous cycles.